

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 180875 TOSEC 080043
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

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DRAFTED BY S/S-O:LMACFARLANE

APPROVED BY S/S-O:LMACFARLANE

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O 021750Z AUG 77 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 180875 TOSEC 080043

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY ONLY AND WHITE HOUSE FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

FOL RPT AMMAN 04386 SENT ACTION SECSTATE DTD 02 AUG 77

QUOTE: S E C R E T AMMAN 4386

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PBOR, PGOV, JO, US, XF

SUBJ: MESSAGE FOR KING HUSSEIN

REF: STATE 177889

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN AUGUST 2 SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM IRAN
AND DELIVERED TO HIM PRESIDENT'S LETTER CONTAINED REFTEL. KING
THANKED ME FOR THE LETTER, SAID HE WAS VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD
TO SECRETARY'S VISIT AND DISCUSSED WITH ME FEW POINTS IN THE LETTER.

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2. I TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO POINT OUT TO HIM FACT THAT YOUR VISIT
WAS TO DISCUSS BOTH FRAMEWORK FOR AND PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS
INVOLVED IN GETTING TO GENEVA. I ALSO CALLED PARTICULARLY TO HIS
ATTENTION, IN CONNECTION WITH INITIAL POINT OF PRESIDENT'S TIME
MAGAZINE INTERVIEW, THE FACT THAT NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES HELPED
TO IMPOSE UPON AND BRING ALONG PARTIES TOWARD CERTAIN GENERALLY
ACCEPTED POSITIONS.

3. KING SAID HE WAS READY TO DO ALL HE COULD TO HELP U.S. IN THIS PROCESS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES AND WITH THE ARAB POSITION IN GENERAL. RECENTLY HE AND HIS COURT CHIEF HAD DISCUSSED WITH THE ARABS TWO QUESTIONS: (A) WHAT CAN THE ARABS DO TO PRESENT A MORE POSITIVE AND HELPFUL POSITION ON PEACE ARRANGEMENTS? AND (B) WHAT CAN THE ARABS DO TO HELP "DODGE" THE PLO? HE SAID HE HAD NOT GOTTEN VERY FAR IN CONCRETE TERMS WITH EITHER OF THESE, BUT HE FELT HE HAD IMPRESSED UPON THE OTHER ARABS THE NEED FOR MORE POSITIVE THINKING ON THESE ISSUES. HE THOUGHT HE COULD DO MORE ON THESE POINTS IN SYRIA THAN IN EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA.

4. I ASKED THE KING ABOUT ASAD'S POSITION. KING SAID HE SENSED THAT AS HIS DOMESTIC, IRAQI AND LEBANESE DIFFICULTIES BUILT UP, ASAD WAS FINDING IT HARDER AND HARDER TO BE ABLE TO AGREE TO GO TO GENEVA. THE ISSUE OF POSSIBLY GOING WITHOUT THE PLO WOULD ALSO MAKE IT HARDER FOR ASAD TO ATTEND. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT IRAQIS OR OTHERS MIGHT FIND A WAY TO BRING ASAD DOWN AND BLOCK SYRIAN ENTRANCE INTO NEGOTIATING PROCESS. I SAID WE CONSIDERED SYRIA AN ESSENTIAL PARTICIPANT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY HELP HE COULD GIVE IN ENCOURAGING SYRIA TO PARTICIPATE, AND THAT I KNEW YOU WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN HIS PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ISSUE.

5. KING DID NOT RAISE QUESTION OF POTENTIAL U.S. CONTACTS WITH PLO IF PLO WERE TO ACCEPT 242 AND 338 AND NEITHER DID I.

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6. HUSSEIN SAID SHAH SEEMED TO BE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN WARRANTED ABOUT PEACE PROSPECTS AND LESS AWARE THAN HE SHOULD BE OF JORDAN'S CONCERN THAT BEGIN UNDER BEAVY PRESSURE MIGHT RESORT TO WAR. KING SAID HE LEFT SHAH FEELING IRANIAN LEADER NOW BETTER UNDERSTANDS SITUATION. KING FEELS SHAH HAS BEEN TOO MUCH, UNTIL NOW, A PRISONER OF OVERLY OPTIMISTIC AND COLORED ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS ON AREA SITUATION.

7. KING SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT IRAQI MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND HIS RECURRING CONCERN THAT IRAQIS WILL MOVE AGAINST KUWAIT MILITARILY.

8. AT KING'S REQUEST I BRIEFED HIM ON SCHEDULE OF YOUR TRIP AND ON EVENTS PROPOSED FOR JODAN. HE CLEARLY WANTS A LOT OF TIME FOR DISCUSSION.

PICKERING UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: KING, TOSEC, CAT-B, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS, PEACE PLANS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 02-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE180875
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: O:LMACFARLANE
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: N770004-0566
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197708105/aaaadljm.tel
Line Count: 111
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 4dae144f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: 77 STATE 177889
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1415698
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MESSAGE FOR KING HUSSEIN
TAGS: PBOR, PGOV, PPDC, PDEV, JO, US, XF, (HUSAYN), (CARTER, JIMMY)
To: ECRETARY WHITE HOUSE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/4dae144f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009